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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-1928 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS SWEGER, 
 
                                      Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:07-cr-0103) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 6, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and SÁNCHEZ,
* 
District Judge. 
 
(Filed: February 8, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
* 
The Honorable Juan R. Sánchez, District Judge of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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SÁNCHEZ, District Judge. 
 Appellant Thomas Sweger pled guilty to one count of distribution and possession 
with intent to deliver heroin and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the 
District Court sentenced him to 132 months of imprisonment.  On appeal, Sweger argues 
the District Court erred in granting an upward departure pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guideline § 5K1.2.  He also argues the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying his request for a downward variance.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
 On February 23, 2007, Sweger sold Isaac Kennedy ten bags of a fentanyl-laced 
heroin known as “Devil‟s Reject.”  Kennedy had purchased Devil‟s Reject from Sweger a 
week earlier and requested to purchase it again.  Following his purchase, Kennedy snorted 
some of the heroin in Sweger‟s presence, and Sweger warned him to be careful when 
ingesting the heroin because of the fentanyl, instructing him to start with a quarter bag 
and not to ingest an entire bag at one time. 
 On February 24, 2007, Kennedy was found dead in his bedroom.  An autopsy 
performed by Dr. Wayne Ross, a specialist in neuropathology, concluded the cause of 
Kennedy‟s death was multiple drug toxicity.  Although a number of substances were 
present in Kennedy‟s blood and liver at the time of his death, fentanyl was the only 
substance present at a lethal level. 
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 On February 27, 2008, Sweger pled guilty to one count of distribution and 
possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1), pursuant to a written plea agreement.  In the plea agreement, the Government 
noted its intention to seek an upward departure to offense level thirty-eight pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 because death resulted from Sweger‟s drug sales.  (App. 68.)  Sweger 
disputed the applicability of this departure. 
 In the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), the probation officer concluded 
Sweger was accountable for possessing between eight and sixteen grams of 
heroin/fentanyl and assigned him a base offense level of eighteen and, after a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, a total offense level of fifteen.  Based on an 
offense level of fifteen and a criminal history category of VI, the probation officer 
calculated Sweger‟s advisory guideline range at forty-one to fifty-one months.  The 
probation officer also suggested the District Court might wish to consider an upward 
departure pursuant to § 5K2.1 if Sweger‟s actions were determined to have resulted in 
Kennedy‟s death, noting the “guideline calculations do not take the death of Kennedy into 
account.”  Sweger objected to such a departure, maintaining he was not responsible for 
Kennedy‟s death. 
 Prior to sentencing, Sweger stipulated that (1) Kennedy died of multiple drug 
toxicity; (2) Kennedy had a lethal level of fentanyl in his body when he died; and (3) 
Sweger was the source of the heroin that caused Kennedy to have fentanyl in his system.  
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(App. 111-117.)  Although Sweger initially appeared to concede the fentanyl-laced heroin 
he sold had caused Kennedy‟s death (App. 117), at a subsequent evidentiary hearing, 
Sweger presented testimony from pharmacology expert Robert Julien, M.D., Ph. D., in an 
effort to establish that the Government had not met its burden to show Kennedy‟s death 
had resulted from the Devil‟s Reject heroin Sweger sold him. 
Dr. Julien testified fentanyl affects the body “[e]xtremely rapid[ly]” after being 
ingested, after which the level of fentanyl in a person‟s blood “drops rapidly.”  (App. 132-
34.)  As a result, Dr. Julien stated he would “expect a fatality from fentanyl overdose to 
occur rapidly [after ingestion], and if one survives that they have a tolerance to the drug in 
that it did not kill them.”  (App. 136.)  Dr. Julien agreed the level of fentanyl in 
Kennedy‟s blood was potentially lethal and testified that if Kennedy “had used the 
fentanyl immediately prior to his death[,] [Julien] would then say this level was most 
likely fatal.”  (App. 143, 158-59.)  Because Kennedy did not die until three to ten hours 
after ingesting the Devil‟s Reject heroin, however, Dr. Julien opined that “much [of the 
fentanyl] would have been metabolized and this level in him likely would not have been 
lethal.”  (App. 159.)  Dr. Julien also stated he could not rule out the possibility Kennedy 
may have died of an accidental or intentional insulin overdose, as Kennedy was an insulin 
dependent diabetic who had previously attempted to kill himself by overdosing on insulin, 
and the autopsy did not test Kennedy‟s insulin or glucose levels.  (App. 137-38, 141, 
156.)  Dr. Julien concluded fentanyl “likely was not” the sole cause of Kennedy‟s death 
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because it “had last been used several hours earlier.”  (App. 160.)  However, he agreed 
fentanyl contributed to Kennedy‟s death, regardless of when it was used.  (Id.)  Elsewhere 
in his testimony, Dr. Julien explained: 
[w]ith an accidental overdose, that could cause . . . him to lose 
consciousness, which may be enough to take this residual level of fentanyl 
that‟s in the blood to cause further unconsciousness and present a point 
where he cannot essentially lift his chin.  As he sleeps he gets airway 
obstruction, develops pulmonary edema, as was described in the . . . autopsy 
report, and eventually died from hypercarbia, which is a high blood CO2, 
and hypoxia, which is a low blood oxygen level. 
 
(App. 141-42.) 
The District Court granted the Government‟s motion for an upward departure 
pursuant to § 5K2.1, finding the Government had proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the fentanyl-laced heroin Sweger sold played a causal role in Kennedy‟s 
death, and departed upward to offense level thirty-eight pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(a)(2).  By separate order, the District Court granted in part Sweger‟s motion for a 
downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(b)(1), finding Sweger‟s criminal 
history category of VI over-represented the seriousness of his criminal record and instead 
assigning him a criminal history category of IV.
1
  With a three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, Sweger‟s offense level was thirty-five, yielding an advisory 
guideline range of 235-293 months.  Because the statutory maximum term of 
 6 
 
imprisonment was 240 months, Sweger‟s effective advisory guideline range became 235-
240 months.  At sentencing, the District Court granted the Government‟s motion for a 
downward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 based on Sweger‟s substantial assistance to law 
enforcement, denied Sweger‟s request for a downward variance, and sentenced Sweger to 
132 months.  Sweger timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s decision to depart upward, reviewing the District Court‟s 
factual findings for clear error and the reasonableness of the degree of the departure for 
an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc); United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999).  We review the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion.  See 
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 Sweger first argues the District Court erred in granting an upward departure 
pursuant to § 5K2.1 because the record does not support a finding that Kennedy‟s death 
resulted from Sweger‟s drug sale.  Section 5K2.1 permits a court to increase a sentence 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 The District Court denied Sweger‟s motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10, which permits a 
downward departure “[i]f the victim‟s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking 
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above the authorized guideline range “if death resulted” from the defendant‟s conduct.  
Sweger concedes that, to support imposition of an upward departure pursuant to § 5K2.1, 
the Government must show only a causal connection between Sweger‟s drug sale and 
Kennedy‟s death, not proximate cause.  (See Appellant‟s Br. 18.)  We reached the same 
conclusion in United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824 (3d Cir. 1999), interpreting a 
similarly worded provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which requires a mandatory 
minimum sentence in certain drug cases “if death or serious bodily injury results from the 
use of such substance.”  We held the “results from” language of the statute does not 
require the government to show the defendant‟s conduct was the proximate cause of 
death, noting “[i]t is obvious Congress intended . . . that the . . . mandatory minimum 
would apply if death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance 
without regard for common law proximate cause concepts.”  Robinson, 167 F.3d at 831. 
Sweger argues Dr. Julien‟s testimony that fentanyl “likely was not” the sole cause 
of Kennedy‟s death, given the protracted time frame between Kennedy‟s use of the drug 
and his death, precludes a finding of the requisite causal connection between Sweger‟s 
drug sale and Kennedy‟s death.  He also asserts the District Court erred in rejecting as 
speculative the possibility Kennedy overdosed on insulin upon finding Sweger had not 
proved this alternative theory “beyond peradventure.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
the offense behavior.” 
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As the District Court noted, however, although Dr. Julien opined that fentanyl was 
not likely the sole cause of Kennedy‟s death, he agreed fentanyl contributed to Kennedy‟s 
death regardless of when it was used.
2
  (App. 160.)  Indeed, Dr. Julien described the 
manner in which fentanyl could have contributed to Kennedy‟s death if Kennedy had also 
overdosed on insulin on the night he died, explaining that the residual level of fentanyl in 
Kennedy‟s blood could have caused further unconsciousness, leading him to “get[] 
airway obstruction, develop[] pulmonary edema, as was described in the . . . autopsy 
report, and eventually die[] from hypercarbia . . . and hypoxia.”  (App. 141-42.)  Thus, the 
District Court concluded that even accepting Dr. Julien‟s insulin overdose theory, 
fentanyl would have been a contributing cause of Kennedy‟s death, and an upward 
departure pursuant to § 5K2.1 would still be warranted.  (App. 17-18, 31.)  We find no 
clear error in this determination. 
Sweger also argues the District Court abused its discretion in departing to offense 
level thirty-eight.  Sweger contends because there is no evidence he engaged in 
premeditated murder, the District Court instead should have used offense level eighteen, 
the offense level associated with involuntary manslaughter involving reckless conduct 
under U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4(a)(2)(A). 
                                                 
2
 When asked directly whether there was a “causal connection” between Kennedy‟s fentanyl use 
and his death, Dr. Julien equivocated, responding “not necessarily.”  (App. 160-61.)  However, 
Dr. Julien‟s opinion that fentanyl contributed to Kennedy‟s death regardless of when it was used 
was unequivocal.  (App. 160.)  
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In departing upward pursuant to § 5K2.1, 
[t]he sentencing judge must give consideration to matters that would 
normally distinguish among levels of homicide, such as the defendant‟s 
state of mind and the degree of planning or preparation.  . . .  The extent of 
the increase should depend on the dangerousness of the defendant‟s 
conduct, the extent to which death or serious injury was intended or 
knowingly risked, and the extent to which the offense level for the offense 
of conviction . . . already reflects the risk of personal injury.  For example, a 
substantial increase may be appropriate if the death was intended or 
knowingly risked or if the underlying offense was one for which base 
offense levels do not reflect an allowance for the risk of personal injury, 
such as fraud.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1.  Here, in determining the extent of the departure, the District Court 
acknowledged Sweger “likely did not intend to kill Kennedy,” but found Sweger “should 
have had every expectation that someone could be harmed, or die, as a result of ingesting 
the heroin distributed by him” as “[h]eroin is illegal and dangerous, and the ingestion of it 
alone may kill even a first-time user.”  (App. 19 n.7.)  Sweger argues this finding is 
contrary to the record evidence because Kennedy had previously purchased Devil‟s Reject 
heroin from Sweger without incident and specifically requested another dose on the night 
he died.  However, the PSR shows Sweger knew the heroin he sold Kennedy was 
dangerous, as he repeatedly warned Kennedy “to be careful when ingesting the heroin” 
and told him “to start with a quarter bag, and not to ingest an entire bag at one time.”  
(PSR 3.)  The record thus supports the District Court‟s finding. 
 Moreover, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s selection of 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) as providing the most analogous offense level.  Section 
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2D1.1(a)(2) provides for an offense level of thirty-eight “if the defendant is convicted 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), . . . and the offense of conviction 
establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance.”  As 
the District Court noted, Sweger‟s conviction “implicated the penalties contained in [21 
U.S.C.] § 841(b)(1)(C).”3  (App. 19.)  Having determined a substantial increase was 
appropriate, the District Court acted within its discretion in increasing Sweger‟s offense 
level to the level that would have applied if Sweger‟s offense of conviction established 
death resulted from the use of the controlled substances he distributed. 
 Finally, Sweger argues his above-Guidelines sentence is substantively 
unreasonable because the District Court abused its discretion in denying a downward 
variance on the basis that the Guidelines significantly overstated the seriousness of his 
criminal history.  He argues the 132-month sentence the District Court imposed is 
substantively unreasonable in light of his history of relatively minor, non-violent crimes 
which were fueled by his drug addiction.
 4
 
                                                 
3
 Section 841(b)(1)(C) specifies the penalties for distributing and possessing with intent to 
distribute Schedule I and II controlled substances in quantities less than those specified in § 
841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). 
4
 Sweger does not argue the District Court committed procedural error by failing to consider the 
nature of his criminal history.  Nor would the record support such an argument.  The District 
Court reviewed Sweger‟s criminal record in addressing his motion for a downward departure 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), and agreed that, given the non-violent nature of his prior 
offenses, a criminal history category of VI over-represented the seriousness of his criminal 
history.  The Court remained troubled, however, by Sweger‟s “stark history of recidivism,” 
which included fifteen convictions in the eight years prior to the offense of conviction in this 
case.  (App. 39-40.)  Accordingly, the Court departed only to a criminal history category of IV, so 
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As we have previously recognized, the abuse-of-discretion standard “means that, 
absent any significant procedural error, we must „give due deference to the district court‟s 
determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,‟ justify the sentence.”  United States 
v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  Where, as here, the District Court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, 
“we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  Id.  The 
record in this case reflects the District Court‟s meaningful consideration of each of the § 
3553(a) factors, including Sweger‟s criminal history and drug addiction as well as the fact 
of Kennedy‟s death.  In these circumstances, we cannot conclude the sentence imposed by 
the District Court was substantively unreasonable.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence. 
                                                                                                                                                             
as to “adequately account[] for the seriousness of [Sweger‟s] criminal history and the likelihood 
that he will recidivate.”  (App. 40.)  The District Court again considered Sweger‟s criminal 
history in addressing the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing, noting that, while Sweger‟s drug 
addiction might explain his “astonishing record,” it did was “hardly an excuse.”  (App. 192-93.) 
